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Abstract
We consider an optimal control problem for a non-autonomous model of ODEs
that describes the evolution of the number of customers in some firm. Namely
we study the best marketing strategy. Considering a L2 cost functional, we
establish the existence and uniqueness of optimal solutions, using an inductive
argument to obtain uniqueness on the whole interval from local uniqueness. We
also present some simulation results, based on our model, and compare them
with results we obtain for an L1 cost functional. For the L1 cost functional the
optimal solutions are of bang-bang type and thus easier to implement, because
at every moment possible actions are chosen from a finite set of possibilities. For
the autonomous case of L2 problem, we show the effectiveness of the optimal
control strategy against other formulations of the problem with simpler controls.
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1. Introduction
Firms spend millions of euros on marketing budgets. The CMO report con-
ducted in 2017 by the Fuqua School of Business, the American Marketing As-
sociation and Delloite shows that firms allocate, in general, between 10% and
20% of their revenues on marketing budgets, depending on the sector where
they operate. Considering the high amounts involved, it is very important to
optimize that allocation. However, as stated by Gupta and Steenburgh [6] al-
locating marketing resources is a complex decision that until recently has been
done based on very simple heuristics or decision rules.
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Among marketing decisions and strategy is the decision to invest in referrals
programs. These programs encourages current customers to recruit new cus-
tomers based on rewards [15]. Contrary to other marketing programs purely
based on spontaneous word-of-mouth, referral programs are marketer directed
with possibility to control message content [3]. However, studies that help mar-
keters to decide about the resource allocation to referral programs are scarce.
For decades, firms have been searching for the best way to maximize profits
and reduce costs. Classical models usually look for ways that help firms allo-
cating their marketing resources while maximizing profits [1]. However, more
recently models have tried to maximize customer equity (the net present value
of the future profit flow over a customers lifetime [12] through an optimal mar-
keting resources allocation [8]). In this sense, and based on the assumption
that the number of customers in a market is limited, it is important to at-
tract/capture new customers at earliest as possible as, otherwise, they can be
attracted/captured by competitors. At the same time, a customer late attrac-
tion/caption will also reduce their customer equity.
Following the growing interest of social networks by product marketing ma-
nagers, recently the classic epidemiologic models have been applied with success
to specific marketing communication strategy, commonly referred as viral mar-
keting. An application of epidemiology to a real-world problem can be found in
[14].
Previously, in [17] the authors of this work proposed a compartmental model
suitable to describe the dynamics of the number of customers of a given firm.
That model was given by a system of ordinary differential equations whose
variables correspond to groups of customers and potential customers divided
according to their profile and whose parameters reflect the structure of the
underlying social network and the marketing policy of the firm. Understand the
flows between these groups and its consequences on the raise of customers of
the firm was the main goal. Highlight the usefulness of these models in helping
firms deciding their marketing policy was another objective.
Election campaign managers and companies marketing products/services
managers, are interested in spreading a message by a given deadline, using
limited resources. So, the optimal resource allocation over the time of the cam-
paign is required and the formulation of such situation as an optimal control
problem is suggested. In [7], that problem is tackled using two epidemic models,
a SIS and a SIR.
In this paper, we consider a modified version of model [17], governed by the
system of ordinary differential equations:
R˙ = −λ2R + λ1C − γ(t)R+ αβ(t)PR/N
C˙ = −λ1C + λ2R − γ(t)C + (1− α)β(t)PR/N
P˙ = −β(t)PR/N + γ(t)(R + C)
(1)
with initial conditions
R(0), C(0), P (0) > 0,
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where R is the number of referral customers, C is the number of regular cus-
tomer, P is the number of potential customers and N = R+ C + P .
The parameters of the model represent the following: λ1 is the natural transi-
tion rate between regular customers and referral costumers, given by the number
of regular customers that become referral customers without external influence
over the number of regular customers (by “without external influence” we mean
without being influenced by referral customers); λ2 is the natural transition rate
between referral costumers and regular customers, given by the number of refer-
ral customers that become regular customers without external influence over the
number of referral customers; γ(t) is the time varying customer defection rate,
equal to the number of customers that cease to be customers over the number
of customers (we assume that this rate is the same among regular and referral
costumers); β(t) is the pull effect due to marketing campaigns, corresponding to
the quotient of the outcome of marketing campaigns by the number of potential
customers (by “outcome of marketing campaigns” it is meant the number of
potential customers that become customers in the sequence of marketing cam-
paigns per unitary marketing cost per time unit); finally, α is the percentage of
referral costumers among the new customers.
The main difference between the above model and the model presented in
[17] is that, instead of using a single compartment corresponding to potential
clients and assuming that a fixed percentage of those potential clients are re-
ferral clients, in [17], the potential clients are divided in two subpopulations
(corresponding to potential regular clients and potential referral clients).
We stress that by using time varying parameters, β(t) and γ(t), in (1) we
obtain a non-autonomous model that is potentially more realistic. The objective
of this paper is to consider an optimal control problem for such non-autonomous
model.
2. Optimal control problem
Inspired in [7], we assume that the campaigner can allocate its resources
in two ways. At time t, he can directly recruit individuals from the popula-
tion with rate u1(t), to be clients (via publicity in mass media). In addition,
he can incentivize clients to make further recruitments (e.g. monetary bene-
fits, discounts or coupons to current customers who refer their friends to buy
services/products from the company). This effectively increases the “spreading
rate” at time t from β(t) to β(t)+u2(t) where u2(t) denotes the “word-of-mouth”
control signal which the campaigner can adjust at time t.
The diagram of the non-autonomous model we propose is shown in Figure
1. The respective equations are the following:

R˙ = −λ2R+ λ1C − γ(t)R+ α1 u1P + α2 (β(t) + u2)PR/N
C˙ = −λ1C + λ2R− γ(t)C + (1− α2)(β(t) + u2)PR/N + u1(1− α1)P
P˙ = −(β(t) + u2)PR/N − u1P + γ(t)R+ γ(t)C
(2)
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Figure 1: The compartmental model.
with initial conditions
R(0), C(0), P (0) > 0. (3)
The parameters u1, u2 will be taken in the space L
∞ functions such that
u1 ∈ [0, u1max] and u2 ∈ [0, u2max].
Our purpose is to minimize the number of potential customers and the cost
associated to the control of the marketing campaigns. To obtain the best reduc-
tion in the number of potential customers, we minimize the evolution history,
P (t), 0 6 t 6 tf . Note that minimizing the number of potential customers
correspond to maximizing the number of customers (potential and referral) and
that by minimizing the evolution history of potential customers, instead of the
final number, we are increasing the customer equity.
We consider the optimal control problem:
J (P, u1, u2) =
∫ tf
0
κ1 P + κ2 u
2
1 + κ3 u
2
2 dt −→ min
R˙ = −λ2R+ λ1C − γR+ α1 u1P + α2 (β(t) + u2)PR/N
C˙ = −λ1C + λ2R− γC + (1 − α2)(β(t) + u2)PR/N + u1(1 − α1)P
P˙ = −(β(t) + u2)PR/N − u1P + γR+ γC
(C(0), R(0), P (0)) = (C0, R0, P0),
(P)
where 0 < κ1, κ2, κ3 < ∞ and R0, C0, P0 are non-negative, the state vari-
ables are absolutely continuous functions, (C(·), R(·), P (·)) ∈ AC([0, tf ];R
4),
and the controls are Lebesgue integrable, (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ L
1([0, tf ]; [0, u1max]×
[0, u2max]).
In sections 3 to 5 we show that a solution of problem (P) exists and is unique
in the whole interval [0, tf ]. To establish the existence of solution, we use a
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standard result that assures the existence of an optimal control pair (u∗1, u
∗
2)
and a corresponding solution of the initial value problem that minimizes the
cost functional over L1([0, tf ]; [0, u1max] × [0, u2max]). The fact that the op-
timal controls are bounded, assures that the optimal controls are in fact in
L∞([0, tf ]; [0, u1max]× [0, u2max]) (see section 4).
To obtain uniqueness, we assume, by contradiction, that there are two dis-
tinct optimal pairs of state and co-state variables
((C,P,R), (p1, p2, p3)) and ((C
∗, P ∗, R∗), (p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3)),
which correspond to two distinct optimal controls (u, v) and (u∗, u∗), verifying
(7) and (8). The existence of some compact positively invariant region Γ, which
is independent on the controls, allows us to prove that there is a contradiction
unless the state variables, the co-state variables and the optimal controls are
the same on a small time interval [0, T ]. The next step consists in describing
an iterative procedure that allows one to extend the uniqueness of solution to
the interval [0, (k + 1)T ], assuming we have uniqueness on the interval [0, kT ].
This allows us to conclude that we have the required uniqueness on the whole
interval after a finite number of steps.
3. Existence of an optimal solution
To prove that there is an optimal solution of problem (P), we will use a result
that ensures the existence of the solution for optimal control problems contained
in Theorem III.4.1 and Corollary III.4.1 in [4], Theorem 1 below. Problem (P)
is an optimal control problem in Lagrange form:
J(x, u) =
∫ t1
t0
L(t, x(t), u(t)) dt −→ min,{
x′(t) = f (t, x(t), u(t)) , a.e. t ∈ [t0, t1],
x(t0) = x0,
x(·) ∈ AC ([t0, t1];R
n) , u(·) ∈ L1([t0, t1];U ⊂ R
m).
(4)
In the above context, we say that a pair (x, u) ∈ AC ([t0, t1];R
n)×L1([t0, t1];U)
is feasible if it satisfies the Cauchy problem in (4). We denote the set of all
feasible pairs by F . Next, we recall
Theorem 1 (See [4]). For problem (4), suppose that f and L are continuous
and there exist positive constants C1 and C2 such that, for t ∈ R, x, x1, x2 ∈ R
n
and u ∈ Rm, we have
a) ‖f(t, x, u)‖ 6 C1(1 + ‖x‖+ ‖u‖);
b) ‖f(t, x1, u)− f(t, x2, u)‖ 6 C2‖x1 − x2‖(1 + ‖u‖);
c) F is non-empty;
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d) U is closed;
e) there is a compact set S such that x(t1) ∈ S for any state variable x;
f) U is convex, f(t, x, u) = α(t, x) + β(t, x)u, and L(t, x, ·) is convex on U ;
g) L(t, x, u) > c1|u|
β − c2, for some c1 > 0 and β > 1.
Then, there exist (x∗, u∗) minimizing J on F .
Applying Theorem 1 to our problem we obtain the following result:
Theorem 2. There exists an optimal control pair (u∗1, u
∗
2) and a corresponding
solution of the initial value problem in (P), (R∗, C∗, P ∗), that minimizes the
cost functional J in (P) over L1([0, tf ]; [0, u1max]× [0, u2max]).
Proof. We first note that, adding the equations in (2), we conclude that the to-
tal population is constant: N(t) = C0+R0+P0 := N0. Thus C(t), R(t), P (t) 6
N0. Additionally, P (t)R(t)/N(t) 6 P (t) 6 N0. We immediately obtain a)
and b).
Conditions c) and d) are immediate from the definition of F since
U = [0, u1max]× [0, u2max].
We conclude that all the state variables are in the compact set
{(x, y, z) ∈ (R+0 )
3 : 0 6 x+ y + z = N0}
and condition e) follows.
Since the state equations are linearly dependent on the controls and L is
quadratic in the controls, we obtain f). Finally,
L = κ1I + κ2u
2
1 + κ3u
2
2 > min{κ2, κ3}(u
2
1 + u
2
2) = min{κ2, κ3}‖(u1, u2)‖
2
and we establish g) with c1 = min{κ2, κ3}.
Thus the result follows from Theorem 1.
4. Characterization of the optimal controls
In this section, using the Pontryagin Maximum Principle [13], we character-
ize the solutions that, according to Theorem 2, the solution exist.
Note that Theorem 1 does not require U to be a bounded set and thus, in
general, the L1 optimal controls predicted by Theorem 1 are not necessarily in
L∞. As a consequence, in general, one can not assure that the optimal controls
satisfy the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, see [13].
However, in our case, the compacity of the set [0, u1max]× [0, [u2max] assures
that the control minimizers, u1
∗ and u2
∗, are in L∞ as required by the Pontrya-
gin Maximum principle. Furthermore, in our context, there are no abnormal
minimizers [2] since in our case only initial conditions are imposed and, in par-
ticular, the state variables are free at the terminal time. Thus, we can fix the
cost multiplier associated with the Lagrangian L to be minus one.
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The Hamiltonian associated with problem (P) is given by:
H(t, (C,R, P ), (p1, p2, p3), (u1, u2))
= κ1P + κ2u
2
1 + κ3u
2
2
+ p1(−λ2R+ λ1C − γ(t)R+ α1 u1P + α2 (β(t) + u2)PR/N)
+ p2(−λ1C + λ2R− γ(t)C + (1− α2)(β(t) + u2)PR/N + u1(1− α1)P )
+ p3(−(β(t) + u2)PR/N − u1P + γ(t)R+ γ(t)C)
In what follows, we use the operator ∂i to denote the partial derivative with
respect to the ith variable.
Theorem 3 (Necessary optimality conditions).
If ((C∗, R∗, P ∗), (u1
∗, u2
∗)) is a minimizer of problem (P), then there are mul-
tipliers (p1(·), p2(·), p3(·)) ∈ AC([0, tf ];R
3) such that
p˙1 = λ2(p1 − p2) + γ(t)(p1 − p3)
+ [p3 − α2p1 − (1− α2)p2] (β(t) + u2)P (C + P )/N
2
p˙2 = λ1(p2 − p1) + γ(t)(p2 − p3)
− [p3 − α2p1 − (1− α2)p2] (β(t) + u2)PR/N
2
p˙3 = −κ1 + [p3 − α1p1 − (1− α1)p2]u1
+ [p3 − α2p1 − (1− α2)p2] (β(t) + u2)R(C +R)/N
2
(5)
for almost all t ∈ [0, tf ], with transversality conditions
p1(tf ) = p2(tf ) = p3(tf ) = p4(tf ) = 0. (6)
Furthermore, the optimal control pair is given by
u1
∗ = min
{
max
{
0,
[p3 − α1p1 − (1− α1)p2]P
∗
2κ2
}
, u1max
}
(7)
and
u2
∗ = min
{
max
{
0,
[p3 − α2p1 − (1 − α2)p2]P
∗R∗
2κ3N∗
}
, u2max
}
. (8)
Proof. Properties (5) and (6) are a consequence of Pontryagin Maximum Prin-
ciple.
The optimality conditions on the set
{t ∈ [0, tf ] : 0 < u1
∗(t) < u1max ∧ 0 < u2
∗(t) < u2max}
yield
∂H
∂u1∗
= 0 ⇔ u1
∗ =
p3 − α1p1 − (1− α1)p2
2κ2
P
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and
∂H
∂u2∗
= 0 ⇔ u2
∗ =
p3 − α2p1 − (1− α2)p2
2κ3
PR
N
.
If t ∈ int{t ∈ [0, tf ] : u1
∗(t) = u1max}, then the maximality condition is
∂H
∂u1∗
6 0 ⇔
p3 − α1p1 − (1− α1)p2
2κ2
P > u1max
and if t ∈ int{t ∈ [0, tf ] : u2
∗(t) = u2max}, then the maximality condition is
∂H
∂u2∗
6 0 ⇔
p3 − α2p1 − (1− α2)p2
2κ3
PR
N
> u2max.
Similarly, if t ∈ int{t ∈ [0, tf ] : u1
∗(t) = 0}, then the maximality condition
is
∂H
∂u1∗
> 0 ⇔
p3 − α1p1 − (1− α1)p2
2κ2
P 6 0
and if t ∈ int{t ∈ [0, tf ] : u2
∗(t) = 0}, then the maximality condition is
∂H
∂u2∗
> 0 ⇔
p3 − α2p1 − (1− α2)p2
2κ3
PR
N
6 0.
5. Uniqueness of solution
In this section we prove the uniqueness of the optimal solution of (P) in the
whole interval [0, tf ]. The proof of this result is inspired on [5, 10]. Namely,
on [5] uniqueness is established in a sufficiently small interval for some au-
tonomous epidemiological models and in [10] the result is proved for a general
non-autonomous version of one of those models and uniqueness is established
on the whole interval.
Theorem 4. The solution of the optimal control problem (P) is unique.
Theorem 4 establishes the uniqueness of the optimal solution of (P) through-
out the time interval where the optimal control problem was considered, [0, tf ].
The proof of this result is done in two steps. Namely, on a first moment we es-
tablish the uniqueness on a sufficiently small time interval [0, T ] and afterwards
we show that the result can be extended to the whole time interval by using an
induction argument.
In more detail, to prove uniqueness on a small time interval, we use a con-
tradiction argument adapted from the argument used in [5], in the autonomous
context, and also considered in [10], for a nonautonomous model. We start by
assuming that there are two distinct optimal pairs of state and co-state variables
corresponding to two different optimal controls. Making a change of variables
we are able to prove that we have a contradiction unless the state and co-state
variables are the same in some sufficiently small time interval and, using the
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characterization of the optimal controls given by (7) and (8) we conclude that
the optimal controls coincide in that small time interval [0, T ].
The second step in the argument, consists in noting that there are two
possibilities: T = tf or T < tf . In the first case the proof is completed.
Otherwise, noting that the estimates used to obtain T in the first place are
only related with the maximum value of the parameters and the bounds for
the state and co-state variables on some invariant region that is independent on
the controls and using for initial conditions at time T the values of the state
trajectories at the right-end of the interval [0, T ], we obtain uniqueness on the
interval [T, 2T ]. Iterating the procedure, after a finite number of steps, we obtain
uniqueness in whole the interval [0, tf ].
The proof of Theorem 4 may be found in Appendix A.
6. Simulation
Parameter Value
α1 0.05
α2 0.10
λ1 0.002
λ2 λ1C0/R0
Table 1: Values of parameters.
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
β1(t)
β2(t)
β3(t)
(A) Functions β1(t), β2(t) and β3(t).
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
γ1(t)
γ2(t)
γ3(t)
(B) Functions γ1(t), γ2(t) and γ3(t).
Figure 2: Recruitment rate functions and defection rate functions.
The optimal control problem is numerically solved using a Runge-Kutta
fourth order iterative method. First we solve the system (2)-(3), by the forward
Runge-Kutta fourth order procedure, and obtain the values of the state vari-
ables (C, R and P ). Using those values, then we solve the system (5) with the
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time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
P w/o c.
P with c.
C with c
C w/o c.
(A) Evolution of C and P .
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
 0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
 0.02
R with c.
R w/o c.
(B) Evolution of R.
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
(C) Variation of the optimal control u1.
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(D) Variation of the optimal control u2.
Figure 3: Optimal control and state variables, with control and without control, of the mar-
keting model, time-varying rate β1 and time-varying rate γ1. Top row: (A) regular customers
C and potential customers P, (B) referral customers R. Bottom row: (C) optimal control u1,
(D) optimal control u2.
transversality conditions (6), by backward fourth order Runge-Kutta procedure,
and obtain the values of the co-state variables. The controls are updated by
a convex combination of the previous values and the new values computed ac-
cording with (7)-(8). The iteration is stopped when the values of the unknowns
at the earlier iteration are very close to the ones at the current iteration.
In what follows, we assume that the maximum rate of direct recruitment of
individuals from the population is u1max = 0.06 (cf. [7]). The word-of-mouth
control is potentiated by the referrals and is expected that all of them may act
as spreaders, so u2max = 1.0. The terminal time is tf = 7 time units and the
remaining parameters are fixed according to Table 1. The initial conditions are
the following:
C0 = 0.009, R0 = 0.001 and P0 = 0.99
We consider that the weight values are κ1 = 1, κ2 = 1.5 and κ3 = 0.01.
We study next the optimal control problem with time dependent rates β(t)
and γ(t). After, in Section 6.2, we analyse the effect of some parameters (γ, κ2,
β and tf ) on the cost functional J of the proposed model.
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time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
P w/o c.
P with c.
C with c
C w/o c.
(A) Evolution of C and P .
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
 0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
R with c.
R w/o c.
(B) Evolution of R.
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
(C) Variation of the optimal control u1.
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(D) Variation of the optimal control u2.
Figure 4: Optimal control and state variables, with control and without control, of the mar-
keting model, time-varying rate β2 and time-varying rate γ2. Top row: (A) regular customers
C and potential customers P, (B) referral customers R. Bottom row: (C) optimal control u1,
(D) optimal control u2.
6.1. Variable recruitment rate β(t) and variable defection rate γ(t).
Inspired in [7], to model the varying interest of a population in recruit new
customers during the campaign duration, we consider three different functions
β1(t), β2(t) and β3(t). They model the cases of increasing, decreasing and
fluctuating interest as the action of the referral customers develops, respectively.
The respective functions, exhibited in Figure 2(A), are defined as:
β1(t) = 0.01 +
0.99
1 + e−2t+8
,
β2(t) = 0.01 + 0.99
(
1−
1
1 + e−2t+6
)
,
β3(t) = 0.01 + 0.49 (1− cos(2pit+ 0.26)) ,
The increasing recruiting rate, β1(t), may represent the increasing interest of
people by election candidates as we approach the polling date. The decreas-
ing recruiting rate, β2(t), may represent gradual loss of interest of people in
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time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
P w/o c.
P with c.
C with c
C w/o c.
(A) Evolution of C and P .
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
 0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
 0.02
R with c.
R w/o c.
(B) Evolution of R.
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
(C) Variation of optimal control u1.
time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(D) Variation of optimal control u2.
Figure 5: Optimal control and state variables, with control and without control, of the mar-
keting model, time-varying rate β3 and time-varying rate γ3. Top row: (A) regular customers
C and potential customers P, (B) referral customers R. Bottom row: (C) optimal control u1,
(D) optimal control u2.
some product after its release (e.g a newly launched smartphone). Fluctuat-
ing recruiting rate, β3(t), may represent changes in demand of a product with
time (e.g seasonal products that have great demand in a given season but little
demand during the rest of the year).
Three distinct scenarios are also proposed to the defection rate to comple-
ment the three cases proposed to the recruitment rate. In the first scenario
we propose that the defection rate is invariant. In second we suggest that the
decreasing recruiting rate is followed by an increasing defection rate. In last
scenario we propose that the oscillating interest is accompanied by an also os-
cillating defection rate. The γi (t) functions for i = 1, 2, 3, exhibited in Figure
2(B), are as follows,
γ1(t) = γ0,
γ2(t) = 0.01 +
0.18
1 + e−2t+7
,
γ3(t) = γ0 (1− 0.9 cos(2pit+ 0.26)) ,
where γ0 = 0.10.
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(A) Evolution of C and P .
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(B) Evolution of R.
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(C) Control u1 and scaled switching func-
tion Φ1.
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0.8
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u2
Φ2
(D) Control u2 and scaled switching func-
tion Φ2.
Figure 6: Optimal control and state variables, with control and without control, of the mar-
keting model with L1 objective, time-varying rate β3 and time-varying rate γ3. Top row: (A)
regular customers C and potential customers P, (B) referral customers R. Bottom row: (C)
control u1 and scaled switching function Φ1, (D) control u2 and scaled switching function Φ2.
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(A) Control u1 for J1 and J2 objectives.
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(B) Control u2 for J1 and J2 objectives.
Figure 7: Comparison of controls u1 and u2 for the L1-type objective (J1) and L2-type
objective (J2) with rates β3 and γ3.
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In the case of the increasing interest of a population in recruiting new cus-
tomers, during the campaign duration (rates β1 and γ1), the solution for the
optimal control problem and solution to the no control problem is illustrated
in Figure 3. In what concerns the optimal solution, the number of referral
customers grows vigorously and reaches its maximum, close to 0.02, almost at
the terminal time. We also notice that the number of customers, referral and
regular, evidence a very light decrease when approaching the end of time in-
terval. On the other hand, the number of referral and regular costumers, of
the no control solution, are lower than the ones of the optimal solution. In the
solution of the no control problem, of the two remaining scenarios, the number
of costumers is also lower than the one of optimal solution (see Figures 4 to 6).
In Figures 3(C), 3(D), while the first control, u1, is maximum in almost all
the time interval, second control, u2, is maximum on a central part of the interval
since t1 (close to 1) up to t2 (between 5 and 6). The controls we obtain for the
following two cases, displayed in Figures 4(C),4(D),5(C),5(D), are analogous to
these ones.
In the case of the decreasing interest of a population in recruiting new cus-
tomers, during the campaign duration (rates β2 and γ2), the solution for the
optimal control problem and solution of no control problem are exhibited in
Figure 4. Relatively to the optimal solution, the evolution of the number of re-
ferrals also grows vigorously in the beginning, but slow down in the second half
of time interval. When approaching terminal time, the number of customers,
referral and regular, exhibit a reduction bigger than the preceding case. This
behaviour is motivated by the recruitment rate β2.
In the case of the periodic interest of a population in recruiting new cus-
tomers, during the campaign duration, the solution for the optimal control
problem with the L2 objective and the solution of the no control problem are
displayed in Figure 5. The periodic nature of the parameters β3 and γ3 in-
fluences the evolution of the three state variables. Relatively to the optimal
solution, the variation of the number of customers, referral and regular, is, in
general, similar to the first case.
The optimal control problem with L1 objective functional, presented in
Appendix B, was also considered in case where the interest in recruiting new
customers is periodic (third case). The optimal solution, obtained analogously
with the Runge-Kutta scheme presented above, and the no control solution are
presented in Figure 6. Relatively to such optimal solution, the customers, refer-
ral and regular, stop growing when the first control, u1, becomes inactive and
their maximums are smaller than those that were obtained with the quadratic
objective. It can also be observed that the switching functions satisfy the strict
bang-bang property (cf. [11]) associated to the Pontryagin Maximum Principle.
Figure 7 compares the optimal controls for the linear functional, J1, with
the quadratic functional, J2. The first control variable u1 differ on a terminal
interval ti < t < tf where we see that the J1 control is inactive while the
J2 control is active (maximum). The second control u2 shows also differences
for the two functionals at beginning and at end of time interval. In Figure
7(B) we can see that these differences are somehow compensated. Like in other
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analogous works where the upper bound equals the value one and the graphics
of control solutions are similar (e.g [16]), the optimal state variables of the two
functionals are almost identical.
6.2. Comparison of optimal control with simpler controls.
The recruiting rate, β, and the defection rate, γ, are constant in this section.
The goal of this section is to compare the effectiveness of optimal control strat-
egy with other simpler control strategies that do not require any optimization
technique.
As in [7], we compare the optimal control problem with three more problems.
Namely: 1) the problem without control (controls are zero); 2) problem where
controls are constant with u′1(t) = (1 − α1)u1max/2 and u
′
2(t) = α2u2max/2
1 ;
3) problem with heuristic controls, know as follow Pnc(t), Pnc(t)Rnc(t) (see [7]),
where controls are u′′1(t) = (1−α1)u1maxPnc(t) and u
′′
2(t) = α2u2maxPnc(t)Rnc(t)
1,
being Pnc(t) and Rnc(t) the fractions of potential customers and referral cus-
tomers, respectively, when no control is applied.
In order to compare the optimal strategy with the remaining strategies, using
ranges of values for parameters γ, β, tf and κ2 similar to [7], we use by default,
in what follows, the weight values: κ1 = 1/tf , κ2 = 15 and κ3 = 1.
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varying k2
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
co
st
 fu
nc
tio
na
l J
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
follow P
nc
(t),P
nc
(t)R
nc
(t)
constant control
no control
optimal control
(B)
Figure 8: Evolution of the value of the objective functional J with: (A) variation of the
defection rate γ with κ2 = 15, (B) variation of the weight parameter κ2 with γ = 0.1.
Parameter values: β = 1, tf = 7.
In Figure 8(A) we display the evolution of the cost function, for the four
problems (or strategies) above mentioned, with variation of the defection rate
γ. The cost functional J for the constant control strategy and follow Pnc(t),
Pnc(t)Rnc(t) strategy is bigger than J for no control. On the other hand, J
for the optimal control strategy is smaller than J for no control strategy for γ
lower than 1.0, but these Js coincide when γ is greater or equal to 1.0. We may
1Since u2(t), in most cases, has rather low values, we multiply u2max by an small constant,
α2.
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conclude that when γ > 1 the optimal control is ineffective and there is no need
of any marketing campaign.
In Figure 8(B) we display the evolution of the cost function with variation of
the weight parameter κ2. The cost functional J for the constant control strategy
and follow Pnc(t), Pnc(t)Rnc(t) strategy are bigger than the J for the optimal
control. We can also see that J for the no control strategy is bigger than J for
the optimal control strategy when κ2 is small, but these strategies tend to have
the same values of J as we consider bigger values for κ2.
We also compared the evolution of the cost function of the optimal control
model with the other three strategies for the variation of β (β ∈ [0, 3]) and tf
(tf ∈ [4, 14]). The resulting figures are not displayed because, in these cases, the
optimal control strategy was the one with smaller values of cost function and
no tendency to approach to one of the other strategies was exhibited. Hence, in
these cases the optimal control is recommended.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have considered an optimal control problem for a nonlinear
system of ordinary differential equations that describes the evolution of the
number of regular customers and referral customers in some firm. The aim is
to study, considering several types of behaviour for the population, the best
marketing strategy in the decision to invest in referrals programs.
The existence and uniqueness of optimal solutions was established for an L2
cost functional model. Some simulation results of such model were presented
and compared with the ones obtained for the model with an L1 cost functional.
The optimal solutions for the problem with linear lagrangian are of bang-bang
type.
While performing the numerical simulations, we have noticed that, for some
values of the cost weights κ1, κ2 and κ3, the solutions for the quadratic objective
model are slightly better than the ones for the linear objective model. Neverthe-
less, the strategy obtained for the linear objective model is easier to implement,
since at each time interval the possible actions are taken from a finite set of
possibilities, and thus may be more appealing to the marketing managers.
For the autonomous case of quadratic cost functional model, we have shown
the effectiveness of the optimal control strategy over the constant control strat-
egy, a heuristic control strategy and the no control.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof. We assume that we have two optimality systems corresponding to tra-
jectories and state equations (R,C, P ), (p1, p2, p3) and (R¯, C¯, P¯ ), (p¯1, p¯2, p¯3) and
we will show that the two coincide in some small interval. Consider the change
of variables
R(t) = eθtr(t), C(t) = eθtc(t), P (t) = eθtq(t)
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and
p1(t) = e
−θtϕ1(t), p2(t) = e
−θtϕ2(t), p3(t) = e
−θtϕ3(t).
Recall that N0 = R(t) + C(t) + P (t) is constant and that the region
{(P,C,R) ∈ (R+0 )
3 : P + C +R = N0} is forward invariant.
By the first equation in (2) we get
θeθtr + eθtr˙ = −λ2 e
θt r + λ1 e
θt c− β1 e
θt r + αu1 e
θt q + αu2 e
2θt rq/N
and thus
θr + r˙ = −λ2r + λ1c− β1r + αu1q + α e
θt u2rq/N.
Subtracting the corresponding barred equation from the above equation we get
θ(r−r¯)+r˙− ˙¯r = −(λ2+β1)(r−r¯)+λ1(c−c¯)+α(u1q−u¯1q¯)+α e
θt(u2rq−u¯2r¯q¯)/N.
Multiplying by (r − r¯), integrating from 0 to T and noting that r(0) = r¯(0) we
have
1
2
(r(T )− r¯(T ))2 + θ
∫ T
0
(r − r¯)2dt
= −(λ2 + β1)
∫ T
0
(r − r¯)2dt+ λ1
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)(r − r¯)dt
+ α
∫ T
0
(u1q − u¯1q¯)(r − r¯)dt+
α eθT
N
∫ T
0
(u2rq − u¯2r¯q¯)(r − r¯)dt
and there are C1, C2 > 0 such that
1
2
(r(T )− r¯(T ))2 + θ
∫ T
0
(r − r¯)2dt
= (λ1/2 + αC1 + αC2 e
θT /N − λ2 − β1)
∫ T
0
(r − r¯)2dt+ λ1/2
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)2dt
+ αC1
∫ T
0
(u1 − u¯1)
2dt+
αC1 + αC2 e
θT
N
∫ T
0
(q − q¯)2dt
+
α2C1C2 e
θT
N
∫ T
0
(u2 − u¯2)
2dt
(A.1)
By the second equation in (2) we get
θeθtc+ eθtc˙ = −λ1 e
θt c+λ2 e
θt r−β2 e
θt c+(1−α)u2 e
2θt rq/N +(1−α)u1 e
θt q
and thus
θc+ c˙ = −λ1c+ λ2r − β2c+ (1− α)u2 e
θt rq/N + (1− α)u1q.
Subtracting the corresponding barred equation from the above equation we get
θ(c− c¯) + c˙− ˙¯c = −(λ1 + β2)(c− c¯) + λ2(r − r¯)
+ (1 − α) eθt(u2rq − u¯2r¯q¯)/N + (1− α)(u1q − u¯1q¯).
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Multiplying by (c− c¯), integrating from 0 to T and noting that c(0) = c¯(0) we
have
1
2
(c(T )− c¯(T ))2 + θ
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)2dt
= −(λ1 + β2)
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)2dt+ λ2
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)(r − r¯)dt
+
(1− α) eθT
N
∫ T
0
(u2rq − u¯2r¯q¯)(c− c¯)dt+ (1− α)
∫ T
0
(u1q − u¯1q¯)(c− c¯)dt
and there are C3, C4 > 0 such that
1
2
(c(T )− c¯(T ))2 + θ
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)2dt
= (λ2/2 + (1− α)C3 e
θT /N + (1− α)C4 − λ1 − β2)
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)2dt
+ (λ2/2 + (1 − α)C3 e
θT /N)
∫ T
0
(r − r¯)2dt
+ (1− α)(C3 e
θT /N + C4)
∫ T
0
(q − q¯)2dt
+
(1− α)C3 e
θT
N
∫ T
0
(u2 − u¯2)
2dt+ (1− α)C4
∫ T
0
(u1 − u¯1)
2dt
(A.2)
By the third equation in (2) we get
θeθtq + eθtq˙ = −u2 e
2θt qr/N − u1 e
θt q + β1 e
θt r + β2 e
θt c
and thus
θq + q˙ = −u2 e
θt qr/N − u1q + β1r + β2c.
Subtracting the corresponding barred equation from the above equation we get
θ(q − q¯) + q˙ − ˙¯q = − eθt(u2qr − u¯2q¯r¯)/N − (u1q − u¯1q¯) + β1(r − r¯) + β2(c− c¯).
Multiplying by (q − q¯), integrating from 0 to T and noting that q(0) = q¯(0) we
have
1
2
(q(T )− q¯(T ))2 + θ
∫ T
0
(q − q¯)2dt
= −
eθT
N
∫ T
0
(u2qr − u¯2q¯r¯)(q − q¯)dt−
∫ T
0
(u1q − u¯1q¯)
2dt
+ β1
∫ T
0
(r − r¯)(q − q¯)dt+ β2
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)(q − q¯)dt
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and there are C5, C6 > 0 such that
1
2
(q(T )− q¯(T ))2 + α
∫ T
0
(q − q¯)2dt
= (β1/2− e
θT C5/N)
∫ T
0
(r − r¯)2dt+ β2/2
∫ T
0
(c− c¯)2dt
+ (β1/2 + β2/2− e
θT C5/N − C6)
∫ T
0
(q − q¯)2dt
−
eθT C5
N
∫ T
0
(u2 − u¯2)
2dt− C6
∫ T
0
(u1 − u¯1)
2dt
(A.3)
To obtain a bound for the controls we use the conditions given by (7) and (8).
We have
(u1 − u¯1)
2
6
[
(p3 − p1α− p2(1− α))P/(2κ2)− (p¯3 − p¯1α− p¯2(1− α))P¯ /(2κ2)
]2
6 (C7 + C˜7 e
θT )[(p− p¯)2 + (ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2 + (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2 + (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2]
(A.4)
and
(u2 − u¯2)
2
6
[
(p3 − p1α− p2(1− α))PR/(2κ3N)− (p¯3 − p¯1α− p¯2(1− α))P¯ R¯/(2κ3N)
]2
6 (C8 + C˜8 e
θT )[(p− p¯)2 + (r − r¯)2 + (ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2 + (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2 + (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2].
(A.5)
Next, using (A.4) and (A.5), we obtain
1
2
(ϕ1(0)− ϕ¯1(0))
2 + θ
∫ T
0
(ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2dt
6 (C9 + C˜9 e
θT )
∫ T
0
(u2 − u¯2)
2
+ (ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2 + (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2 + (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2 + (c− c¯)2 + (p− p¯)2 dt
6 (C10 + C˜10 e
θT )
∫ T
0
(ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2 + (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2
+ (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2 + (c− c¯)2 + (p− p¯)2 + (r − r¯)2 dt,
(A.6)
1
2
(ϕ2(0)− ϕ¯2(0))
2 + θ
∫ T
0
(ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2dt
6 (C11 + C˜11 e
θT )
∫ T
0
(u2 − u¯2)
2 + (ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2
+ (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2 + (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2 + (r − r¯)2 + (p− p¯)2 dt
6 (C12 + C˜12 e
θT )
∫ T
0
(ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2 + (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2 + (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2
+ (p− p¯)2 + (r − r¯)2 dt
(A.7)
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and
1
2
(ϕ3(0)− ϕ¯3(0))
2 + θ
∫ T
0
(ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2dt
6 (C13 + C˜13 e
θT )
∫ T
0
(u1 − u¯1)
2 + (u2 − u¯2)
2 + (ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2 dt
+ (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2 + (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2 + (r − r¯)2 + (c− c¯)2 dt
6 (C14 + C˜14 e
θT )
∫ T
0
(ϕ1 − ϕ¯1)
2 + (ϕ2 − ϕ¯2)
2
+ (ϕ3 − ϕ¯3)
2 + (p− p¯)2 + (r − r¯)2 + (c− c¯)2 dt.
(A.8)
Let
Ψ(t) = (r(t) − r¯(t))2 + (c(t) − c¯(t))2 + (q(t)− q¯(t))2
and
Φ(t) = (ϕ1(t)− ϕ¯1(t))
2 + (ϕ2(t)− ϕ¯2(t))
2 + (ϕ3(t)− ϕ¯3(t))
2.
Adding equations (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8) we obtain for the
sum of left-hand sides
1
2
Ψ(T ) +
1
2
Φ(0) + θ
∫ T
0
Ψ(T ) + Φ(T )dt
and thus
1
2
[Ψ(T ) + Φ(0)] + α
∫ T
0
Ψ(T ) + Φ(T )dt
6 C˜
∫ T
0
Ψ(T ) + Φ(T )dt+ CˆeαT
∫ T
0
Ψ(T ) + Φ(T )dt
witch is equivalent to
1
2
[Ψ(T ) + Φ(0)] + (θ − C˜ − CˆeθT )
∫ T
0
Ψ(T ) + Φ(T )dt 6 0. (A.9)
We now choose θ so that
θ > C˜ + Cˆ
and note that θ−C˜
Cˆ
> 1. Subsequently, we choose T such that
T <
1
θ
ln
(
θ − C˜
Cˆ
)
.
Then,
θT < ln
(
θ − C˜
Cˆ
)
⇒ eαT <
θ − C˜
Cˆ
.
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It follows that θ − C˜ − CˆeθT > 0, so inequality (A.9) can hold if and only
if, for all t ∈ [0, T ], we have r(t) = r¯(t), c(t) = c¯(t), q(t) = q¯(t), ϕ1(t) = ϕ¯1(t),
ϕ2(t) = ϕ¯2(t), and ϕ3(t) = ϕ¯3(t). But this is equivalent to R(t) = R¯(t),
C(t) = C¯(t), P (t) = P¯ (t), p1(t) = p¯1(t), p2(t) = p¯2(t) and p3(t) = p¯3(t).
This establishes the uniqueness of the optimal control on the interval [0, T ].
We have two possibilities. If T > tf , then we have uniqueness on the whole
interval and we are done. Otherwise, if T < tf , considering the optimal control
problem whose initial conditions on time T coincide with the values of the state
variables on the end-time of the interval [0, T ], we can obtain uniqueness on
[T, 2T ] (note that, by the forward invariance of the set
S = {(C,P,R) ∈ (R+0 )
3 : C +R+ P 6 C0 +R0 + P0},
and since the constants C˜ and Ĉ in (A.9) depend only on the values of the
several state and co-state variables on S, we still have the same T ). Iterating
the procedure, we conclude that we have uniqueness on the whole interval [0, tf ],
after a finite number of steps. The proof is complete.
Appendix B. The optimal control problem with the L1 objective
functional.
A quadratic objective favors lower rates: a recruitment rate lower than the
maximum, u+, contributes with a value, much smaller, than u+, to the cost
(note that u2+ ≪ u+). This feature is not related to the system, but is imposed
by the choice of the functional and the maximum value of u+. Hence, the linear
objective, by incorporating the totality of controls, may be a more adequate
choice.
Let us consider the linear objective:
J ′(P, u1, u2) =
∫ tf
0
κ1 P + κ2 u1 + κ3 u2 dt
where 0 < κ1, κ2, κ3 <∞ are weights that balance out the relative importance
of the three terms.
Using the adjoint variables p = (p1, p2, p3), the Hamiltonian of the linear
objective functional and system (2) is the following
H′(t, (C,R, P ), (p1, p2, p3), (u, v))
= κ1P + κ2u1 + κ3u2
+ p1(−λ2R+ λ1C − γ(t)R+ α1 u1P + α2 (β(t) + u2)PR/N)
+ p2(−λ1C + λ2R− γ(t)C + (1− α2)(β(t) + u2)PR/N + u1(1− α1)P )
+ p3(−(β(t) + u2)PR/N − u1P + γ(t)R+ γ(t)C)
We obtain the adjoint equations by
p˙1 (t) = −
∂H′
∂R
, p˙2 (t) = −
∂H′
∂C
and p˙3 (t) = −
∂H′
∂P
,
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whose expressions are as in (5).
Once the terminal state, (R(tf ), C(tf ), P (tf )), is free, the transversality con-
ditions are again
p1(tf ) = p2(tf ) = p3(tf ) = 0.
Since H′ is linear in the control, this minimization problem can easily be
solved [9, 16]. Defining the so-called switching functions, Φ1 and Φ2 as
Φ1(t) = κ3 + (α1p1(t) + (1− α1)p2(t)− p3(t))P (t)
and
Φ2(t) = κ3 + (α2p1(t) + (1 − α2)p2(t)− p3(t))P (t)R(t)/N.
Then the minimum condition for the optimal controls u1(t), u2(t), is equiva-
lent to the minimization problem Φi(t)ui(t) =
min
06ui6uimax
Φi(t)ui, i = 1, 2. This
gives the following control functions
ui (t) =

0 if Φi(t) > 0
uimax if Φi(t) < 0
singular if Φi(t) = 0 on an open subset of [0, tf ]
, i = 1, 2. (B.1)
We do not discuss singular controls, since singular arcs never appeared in
our computations. In view of the transversality conditions, the terminal values
of the switching functions are: Φ1(tf ) = κ2 and Φ2(tf ) = κ3. According with
the definition of control (B.1), we may conclude that u1(tf ) = u2(tf ) = 0, as
with the quadratic functional.
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